ABSTRACT Secure cloud storage has important applications in our big data-driven society, and to achieve secure cloud storage, we need to enforce strong access control mechanism. Proxy re-encryption (PRE) has been shown to be an effective tool of constructing cryptographically enforced access control schemes. In a traditional PRE scheme, a semi-trusted proxy can convert all ciphertexts for a delegator to ciphertexts for a delegatee once the proxy obtains the relevant re-encryption key from the delegator. In many practical applications, however, a fine-grained delegation of decryption abilities may be demanded, and thus, the notion of conditional PRE (C-PRE) is introduced, which allows only the ciphertexts satisfying a concrete condition to be converted by the proxy. In this paper, we introduce a special kind of C-PRE, sender-specified PRE (SS-PRE), which enables the delegator to delegate the decryption right of the ciphertexts from a specified sender to his/her delegatee. We give a formal definition of SS-PRE and its security model. We also provide the concrete constructions of an IND-CPA secure SS-PRE scheme and an IND-CCA secure SS-PRE scheme with the properties of unidirectionality and single-use and prove the security of both schemes in the standard model. The detailed analysis shows that our new IND-CCA secure SS-PRE scheme achieves a higher efficiency in computation cost and ciphertext size than the conventional C-PRE schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring data confidentiality, one of the three fundamental principles of information security, often involves the use of interactive cryptographic protocols and algorithms. For example, the proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme, first introduced by Blaze et al. [1] at EUROCRYPT 1998, allows a semi-trusted proxy with knowledge of the re-encryption key to transform a ciphertext under a delegator's public key into another ciphertext (without changing the original plaintext) under a delegatee's public key. However, the proxy will not be able to obtain any information about the plaintext and the private keys of the delegator and the delegatee. There are a number of desirable properties in a PRE scheme (e.g. unidirectionality, multi-usability, non-interactivity, proxy invisibility, original-access, key optimality, collusion-safeness, temporality, non-transitivity, and non-transferability), which have been discussed in the literature. We refer interested reader to [2] for an overview.
Of the many properties, transformation direction (unidirectional/bidirectional) and transformation times (multi-use/ single-use) are two important properties to be considered in the design of a PRE scheme. We can broadly categorize PRE schemes into unidirectional (see [3] - [5] ) and bidirectional (see [1] , [6] ) schemes based on the transformation direction; single-use (see [4] , [5] , [7] ) and multi-use (see [3] , [7] ) schemes based on the transformation times; and public key based (see [1] - [4] , [8] - [11] ) and identitybased (see [7] , [12] , [13] ) schemes based on the setup setting. In the literature, PRE schemes are generally implemented with or without pairings, and there are relatively few schemes constructed on Lattices (see [14] , [15] ). Recently, PRE has been found as one of the underlying cryptographic primitives in secure cloud computing and cloud storage research (see [16] - [22] ).
A common weakness of the above PRE schemes is that once a delegator has generated a re-encryption key and sent it to a proxy, all the delegator's ciphertexts will be transformed by the proxy so that the delegatee can decrypt these ''transformed" ciphertexts using his own private key. It is not applied to many practical applications that a fine-grained delegation of decryption abilities is demanded. Consequently, the notion of conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE) was introduced [23] , [24] , which allows only the ciphertexts satisfying a concrete condition to be converted by the proxy. C-PRE has been shown to be a useful primitive and a lot of C-PRE schemes have been proposed in the literature [25] - [29] . In this paper, we introduce a special kind of C-PRE, sender-specified PRE (SS-PRE), which enables the proxy to transform ciphertexts only from a specified sender. SS-PRE has also many applications (such as encrypted email forwarding, secure cloud storage, and group key management) and, more importantly, a tailored SS-PRE scheme may result in a higher efficiency than conventional C-PRE schemes.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We regard our main contributions to be two-fold:
• We introduce a special kind of C-PRE, named SS-PRE, which has practical real-life applications that need a fine-grained access control. We give a formal definition of SS-PRE and its security model.
• We give concrete constructions of an IND-CPA secure SS-PRE scheme and an IND-CCA secure SS-PRE scheme and prove their security under the modified decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model. Our proposed second scheme achieves a higher efficiency in computation cost and ciphertext size than conventional IND-CCA secure C-PRE schemes.
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the underlying definitions, assumptions and security model required in the proofs of our proposed schemes. Sections III and IV respectively describe our IND-CPA secure and IND-CCA secure SS-PRE schemes and their security proofs. In Section V, we evaluate the efficiency of our IND-CCA secure SS-PRE. We conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR MAP AND COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTION
Definition 1: Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, and g a generator of G. We say that e : G × G → G T is a bilinear (or pairing) map if it has the following properties:
• Computable: e is efficiently computable.
Let BSetup be the algorithm that, given as input an security parameter κ, outputs the parameters (q, g, G, G T , e) as in Definition 1, where q ∈ (2 κ ).
Definition 2: Let (q, g, G, G T , e) ← BSetup(κ) for a security parameter κ. The modified decisional bilinear DiffieHellman (mDBDH) problem is to decide whether T = e(g, g) b/a given a tuple (g, g a , g b , T ) ∈ G 3 × G T , where a, b ∈ R Z * q . Let κ be a security parameter of sufficient size. Formally, we say that the mDBDH assumption holds in G, G T , if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A, the following equation holds:
where v(·) is a negligible function, i.e., for all polynomial functions p(·), we have v(κ) < 1/p(κ).
B. SS-PRE
A formal description of SS-PRE schemes is given in Definition 3.
Definition 3: An SS-PRE scheme contains the following six algorithms:
• par ← Setup(κ): Given as input a system security parameter κ, this algorithm outputs the system's public parameters par. For simplicity of description, we assume that par is an implicit input for other algorithms.
• (pk i , sk i ) ← KeyGen(i): Given as input a user i, this algorithm outputs the public-private key pair (pk i , sk i ) for this user.
• c s→r ← Enc(sk s , pk r , m): Given as input the private key sk s of the message sender, the public key pk r of the message receiver, and a message m in the message space M, this algorithm outputs an original ciphertext c s→r of m.
• rk s→i→j ← ReKeyGen(pk s , sk i , pk j ): Given as input the public key pk s of the message sender, private key sk i of the delegator, and public key pk j of the delegatee, this algorithm outputs a unidirectional re-encryption key from the delegator to the delegatee as rk s→i→j . The proxy can transform any ciphertexts sent from a sender (whose public key is pk s ) to the delegator (whose public key is pk i ) into the ciphertexts for the delegatee (whose public key is pk j ) using the re-encryption key rk s→i→j .
• c s→i→j ← ReEnc(c s→i , rk s→i→j ): Given as input a ciphertext c s→i sent from user s (whose public key is pk s ) to user i (whose public key is pk i ), and a re-encryption key rk s→i→j from user i to j (whose public key is pk j ), this algorithm transforms the original ciphertext c s→i to a re-encrypted ciphertext c s→i→j under the public key of the user j.
• m ← Dec(c j , sk j ): Given as input a ciphertext c j and a private key sk j of the user j, this algorithm outputs the is an SS-PRE scheme. To define a game, denoted by Exp
, ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA}, between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A, we introduce the oracles that the adversary A can query during the game:
• O pk (i): public key generation oracle. Given as input an index i, C runs KeyGen(i) to generate a key pair (pk i , sk i ) and returns pk i to A and stores (pk i , sk i ) in a predefined table T pk . We assume that the adversary A has made appropriate O pk queries before executing the below queries. 1
• O sk (pk i ): private key generation oracle. Given as input pk i by A, C seeks pk i from the table T pk and returns the corresponding sk i to A.
• O rk (pk s , pk i , pk j ): re-encryption key generation oracle. Given as input three public keys pk s , pk i and pk j of the sender s, the delegator i and the delegatee j, respectively, C first retrieves the private key sk i of the delegator i from the table T pk . Then C runs ReKeyGen(pk s , sk i , pk j ) and returns the re-encryption key rk s→i→j to A.
• O reenc (pk s , pk i , pk j , c s→i ): re-encryption oracle. Given as input three public keys pk s , pk i and pk j of the sender s, the delegator i and the delegatee j, respectively, and an original ciphertext c s→i of the delegator i, C first retrieves the re-encryption key rk s→i→j by running ReKeyGen(pk s , sk i , pk j ). Next, C computes c s→i→j = ReEnc(c s→i , rk s→i→j ) and sends c s→i→j back to A.
• O dec (c j , pk j ): If ATK=CPA, this oracle is denied to A. For ATK=CCA, C first retrieves the private key sk j from the table T pk . Next, C computes m = Dec(c j , sk j ) and returns m or ⊥ (an error symbol) to A.
Now the game Exp IND−SS−PRE−ATK E,A
can be described as follows.
Game Exp 
ReEnc(c * r , rk s * →r * →i ). Now we define the advantage of A in the game Exp
as:
Definition 5:
We say that an SS-PRE scheme E is IND-ATK secure if for all PPT algorithms A, we have Adv
, where ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA} and v(·) is a negligible function.
Remark 1: We do not provide the re-encrypted ciphertext to the adversary A, since we allow A to make re-encryption key generation query and hence it is trivial for A to transform c * r to a re-encrypted ciphertext using the obtained re-encryption key. However, the following trivial cases are abandoned: (1) if A has access to a re-encryption key from pk * r to some user pk i , then A is not allowed to make a private key query on pk i ; or (2) if A has access to a private key of a user pk i , then A is not allowed to make a re-encryption key query from pk * r to pk i .
III. PROPOSED IND-CPA SECURE SS-PRE SCHEME
In this section, we present the first IND-CPA secure SS-PRE scheme and its security proof.
A. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
• par ← Setup(κ): Given as input the system security parameter κ, this algorithm outputs the system's public parameters par = (q, g, G, G T , e, g 1 ), where (q, g, G, G T , e) = BSetup(κ) and g 1 = e(g, g). The message space is M = G T .
•
To get a public-private key VOLUME 6, 2018 P. Zeng, K.-K. R. Choo: New Kind of C-PRE for Secure Cloud Storage pair (pk i , sk i ) for user i, the algorithm selects x i from Z * q randomly and sets sk i = x i and pk i = g x i .
• c s→i ← Enc(sk s , pk i , m): To encrypt a message m ∈ M under the receiver i, the sender s selects t ← R Z * q and computes
The ciphertext is outputed as c s→i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , c i,3 ).
• rk s→i→j ← ReKeyGen(pk s , sk i , pk j ): The delegator i computes a re-encryption key for the specific sender s and delegatee j as
The re-encryption key rk s→i→j is sent to the delegator's proxy who can transform a ciphertext from the sender s to the delegator i to a ciphertext under the delegatee j using rk s→i→j .
• c s→i→j ← ReEnc(c s→i , rk s→i→j ): The proxy does the following operations to obtain a ciphertext c s→i→j :
) and rk s→i→j as (rk
s→i→j ); 2) Checks whether e(c i,1 , g) = e(c i, 3 , rk (1) s→i→j ). If not, returns ⊥ which indicates that the ciphertext is not allowed to be re-encrypted. Otherwise, the proxy computes (c j,1 , c j,2 , c j,3 ) , where c j, g) b/a and 0 otherwise.
The interaction between the two adversaries A and B is described as follow:
Setup: B generates the scheme's system parameters par = (q, g, G, G T , e, g 1 ) and gives par to A, where (q, g, G, G T , e) = BSetup(κ) for some security parameter κ and g 1 = e(g, g).
Find: In the find phase, B responds to A's queries as follows:
• On an O pk (i) query: B chooses a random x i ∈ Z * q . Using the techniques of Coron [11] , B flips a biased coin b i ∈ {0, 1} satisfying b i = 1 with probability γ and 0 otherwise, where γ is a constant to be determined later. If b i = 1, B sets pk i = g x i which means that the private key of the user i is x i . Otherwise, if b i = 0, B sets pk i = (g a ) x i which means that the private key of the user i is ax i (in this case, the private key is unknown to B, too). Finally, B returns pk i to A and stores (pk i , x i , b i ) in T pk , where T pk is a table to record all public keys during the game and is initially empty. Without loss of generality, we assume that A has made the appropriate O pk queries before executing the below queries.
• On an O sk (pk i ) query: B first visits the , 0) , B computes the reencryption key rk s→i→j = (rk 0 and (b s , b j ) = (0, 0) , B aborts. 
viewed as being sent from the sender s to the receiver r. Finally, c * r is sent to A as a challenge ciphertext. Guess: A can make more queries as in the Find phase, with the following restrictions: 
Suppose A made q rk re-encryption key extraction queries, then the probability that B does not abort is more than γ q rk . 3) On an O reenc (pk s , pk i , pk j , c s→i ) query (i = j), B will not abort if there is a re-encryption key returned for this query. The probability analysis is as same as the case in an O rk (pk s , pk i , pk j ) query. Suppose that A made q re reencryption queries, then the probability that B does not abort is more than γ q re . 4) When A outputs its guess bit d , B will not abort if b * r = 0. The probability in this case is 1 − γ . It is obvious that if B does not abort, the view of A during the simulation is the same as the one in the real attack. The total probability that B does not abort is f (γ ) : at the point γ opt = 1 − 1/(q sk + q rk + q re + 1). Using γ opt , the probability that B does not abort is at least 1 e(q sk +q rk +q re +1) for large value of q sk + q rk + q re . This shows that B has an advantage of at least ε/e(q sk + q rk + q re + 1).
IV. PROPOSED IND-CCA SECURE SS-PRE SCHEME
In this section, we present our second SS-PRE scheme and its IND-CCA security in the standard model.
A. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
• par ← Setup(κ): Given as input a security parameter κ, this algorithm outputs the system's public param-
h 3 are three elements randomly selected from G, and H : {0, 1} * → Z * q is a one-way collision-resistant hash function. M = G T is the message space.
• (pk i , sk i ) ← KeyGen(i): To get a public-private key pair (pk i , sk i ) for a user i, the algorithm selects x i from Z * q randomly and sets sk i = x i and pk i = g x i .
and
Then the ciphertext is outputed as
• rk s→i→j ← ReKeyGen(pk s , sk i , pk j ): The delegator i generates a re-encryption key rk s→i→j for a specific sender s and delegatee j as
Then the re-encryption key rk s→i→j is sent to the delegator's proxy who can transform a ciphertext from the sender s to the delegator i to a ciphertext under the delegatee j using rk s→i→j .
• c s→i→j ← ReEnc(c s→i , rk s→i→j ): The proxy performs the following operations to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext c s→i→j : 1) Parses c s→i as (c i,1 , c i,2 , c i,3 , c i,4 , c i,5 ) and rk s→i→j as (rk
s→i→j ). 
• m ← Dec(c j , holds. If not, the delegatee outputs ⊥; otherwise the message m.
Consistency:
The decryption function Dec(c j , sk j ) of our second PSS-PRE scheme is the same as that in our first SS-PRE scheme proposed in Subsection III-A, except that the decrypter needs to verify the ciphertext in order to guarantee its non-malleability. So, it is trivial to note that our second SS-PRE scheme is also consistent.
B. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 2: Suppose that the mDBDH problem is hard. Then our second SS-PRE scheme proposed in Subsection IV-A is IND-CCA secure in the standard model.
Proof: Assume that A is a PPT adversary with a non-negligible advantage in attacking our second SS-PRE scheme. We construct a PPT adversary B that, with the help of A, has the ability of solving the mDBDH problem in G, G T with a non-negligible advantage. That is, for a properlydistributed tuple (g, g a , g b , g) b/a and 0 otherwise.
The interaction between the two adversaries A and B is described as follows:
Setup: B generates the system parameters par = (q, g, G, G T , e, g 1 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , H) and gives par to A, where (q, g, G, G T , e) = BSetup(κ) for some security parameter κ, 
Guess: In addition to the restrictions described in the Guess phase in Subsection III-B, the adversary A is not allowed to make a decryption query on the target ciphertext, i.e. A is not allowed to make an O dec (c * r , pk * r ) query in this stage.
Decision: The phase is similar to the Decision phase in Subsection III-B.
Probability analysis that B does not abort. 1) For the queries O sk (pk i ), O rk (pk s , pk i , pk j ), and O reenc (pk s , pk i , pk j , c s→i ), the probability that B does not abort is as same as in Subsection III-B. 2) On an O dec (c j , pk j ) query, B will not abort in case of b i = 1. Suppose A made q dec decryption queries during the simulation, then the probability that B does not abort is γ q dec .
P. Zeng, K.-K. R. Choo: New Kind of C-PRE for Secure Cloud Storage 3) When A outputs a guess bit d , B will not abort if b * r = 0. The probability in this case is 1 − γ . It is obvious that if B does not abort, then the view of A during the simulation process is the same as the one in the real attack. The total probability that B does not abort is (1 − γ )γ q sum which has a maximum value
at the point γ opt = 1 − 1/(q sum + 1), where q sum = q sk + q rk + q re + q dec . Using γ opt , the probability that B does not abort is at least 1 e(q sum +1) when the sum q sum goes to infinity. This shows that B has an advantage of at least ε/e(q sum + 1).
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the performance of the proposed IND-CCA secure SS-PRE scheme with a certificatebased proxy re-encryption of Libert and Vergnaud (hereafter referred to as LV) [4] and a C-PRE scheme [26] . Both our scheme and the LV scheme are unidiretional and single-use, and implemented in bilinear groups in the standard model; whilst the C-PRE scheme realizes fine-grain access control on delegation by specifying the condition (i.e. keyword) about the delegation of the decryption of an encrypted data. Table 1 shows a comparative summary in terms of computation cost and ciphertext size (the performance data of the LV scheme and the C-PRE scheme are referred to [26] ). In this table, |G| and |G T | denote the numbers of bits of presenting an element in the groups G and G T , respectively, and |svk|, |σ |, and |sym| denote the lengths of a verification key, a signature, and the ciphertext of a one-time symmetric encryption, respectively. On the other hand, we evaluate the computation cost based on:
• E: the exponentiation operation in G or G T ;
• P: the pairing operation in G T ;
• S: the signing operation of a strong one-time signature algorithm; and
• V: the verifying operation of a strong one-time signature algorithm. As shown in Table 1 , our second SS-PRE scheme is more efficient than LV [4] and C-PRE [26] in computation cost (including ReKeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, and Dec), given that the pairing operation is much more time-consumed than the exponentiation operation. On the other hand, we remark that the schemes in [4] and [26] use a strong one-time signature, which is not the case in our construction. This results in a shorter ciphertext sizes in our second SS-PRE scheme. The advantage in the computation cost and ciphertext size enables our second SS-PRE scheme to be deployed in many environments because the proxy responsible for the ReEnc algorithm usually has more computational resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is a topic of active research, which is unsurprising due to its potential to be deployed in a number of real-world applications. Using a PRE scheme, one could transform a ciphertext from a delegator to a delegatee with the help of a semi-trusted proxy.
In this paper, we introduced a new kind of conditional PRE (C-PRE), named sender-specified PRE (SS-PRE), for secure cloud storage which allows a proxy to transform ciphertexts only from a specified sender (rather than all ciphertexts). We gave a formal definition of SS-PRE and its security model. We then constructed two concrete SS-PRE schemes and proved their IND-CPA security and IND-CCA security respectively under the modified decisional bilinear DiffieHellman assumption in the standard model. The detailed analysis shown that our new IND-CCA secure SS-PRE scheme achieves a higher efficiency in computation cost and ciphertext size than conventional C-PRE schemes. 
